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TiHE TREATY BASIS FOp APPROXIMATION oF LAWS
The general provisions of article three of the Treaty establishing the European
:Economic Community (E.E.C.) include a directive that Community activities should
include the "approximation of . ..municipal law to the extent necessary for the
functioning of the Common Market.' This general mandate for "approximation of
law" is further detailed by the Treaty in two different ways:
i. By express Treaty provisions relating to:
a. customs and tariff matters;2
b. a number of different situations within the scope of rules envisaging the
free movement of persons, services, and capital within the Member States;'
c. mutual regulation of transport matters;4
d. rules governing competition;'
e. certain fiscal matters;'
f. measures to assist the exports from Member States to nonmember coun-
tries; 7
g. labor legislation and social security; 8
h. the situations within the purview of article 22o
J. Dr. 195o, University of Pavia (Italy), Ph.D. 1955, Cambridge University (England). Lecturer in
'Comparative Law, University of Milan (Italy). Associated with the Legal Department, European Eco-
nomic Community, 1959. Author, LA CAMBIALE IN DRIsTuo INOLESE, CERTAIN COMPARATIVE ASPECTS
oF THE CAaRER'S LIABILITY [under the English and French legal systems] (x956). Contributor on
tsubjects of private, commercial, and comparative law to legal periodicals.1
"For the purposes set out in the preceding Article, the activities of the Community shall include,
,under the conditions and with the timing provided for in this Treaty: . . . (h) the approximation of
their respective municipal law to the extent necessary for the functioning of the Common Market." E.E.C.
'Treaty art. 3.
21d. art. 27.
'Id. articles 54, 57, 58, and 66 deal with the need to eliminate obstacles to the "right of establishment"
and to the free flow of services, so that those engaged in non-wage-earning activities are not restricted to
a single country. Article 56 deals with the coordination of special rules which limit the activities of
:persons or companies from non-Member States and are based on reasons of public order, public safety,
and public health.
'Article 75.5 Articles 85, 86.
' These relate to turnover taxes, excise duties, and other forms of indirect taxation, including com-
;pensatory measures applying to exchanges between Member States. Article 99.
" Article 112.
' Articles 117, '18.
' This article provides for negotiations between Member States to coordinate rules relating to the
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2. A broad authorization, set forth in articles ioo-io2, for direct intervention by
institutions of the E.E.C. to reconcile the legislative and administrative rules
and regulations of Member States when:
a. the existence of a disparity in the legal systems of Member States directly
affects the establishment and functioning of the Common Market;10
b. an existing disparity in the legislative or administrative provisions of the
Member States distorts conditions of competition within the Common
Market;" or
c. it is feared that a Member State's enactment or amendment of a legislative
or administrative provision may distort conditions of competition in the
Common Market.' 2
Much attention 8 has been devoted to articles oo-io2 of the E.E.C. Treaty-three
articles which together comprise a chapter, entitled "Approximation of Laws. '14
It is interesting, however, that in the Treaty itself, although article 3 (h) refers to
the objective of approximating municipal law'5 and article 117 contains a general
reference to "the approximation of legislative and administrative provisions," only
in article ninety-nine, which deals with taxation, is there a specific cross-reference
to the procedures authorized by articles ioo-io2.18 The express Treaty provisions
relating to approximation of laws in certain specified matters are subject to a more
or less rigorous schedule for taking different steps towards the goal.V 7 On the other
hand, the application of articles xoo-ioz is unlimited as to subject matter'" and in-
determinate as to time-and clearly the approximation of laws cannot be limited
as to time, since it may occur at an advanced stage in the realization of European
economic integration.
To what extent was it intended by the Treaty's draftsmen that resort to the
procedures of articles ioo-io2 should be permissible even in instances where the
protection of citizens vis-I-vis the state, the elimination of double taxation, mutual recognition of com-
panies, and reciprocal recognition and execution of judicial decisions and arbitral awards.
" Article zoo.
"'Article ioi.
1 2 Article o2.
DauxiimE RAPPOR" GkNiRAL SUR L'AaTIVITI DR LA COziMUNAUTE paras. 125-26 (1959); Monaco,
Le rapprochernent des legislations nationales dans le cadre du Marche Commun, 3 ANNUTAiR FsXWs
DR DROIT INTERNATIoNAL 558 (1957); commentary of Thiesing, in VoN DER GRORBEN & VON BROECKH
(EUS.), HANDBUCH FUR EuROPIsCHE NVIRTscHAFTr 3 (1959)"
"This is chapter 3 of Part three, Title x.
1 5 The chapter on approximation of laws, note 14 supra, provides the rules for the realization of the
objective stated in article 3(h), just as the objectives stated in other paragraphs of article 3 have corre-
sponding groups of rules elsewhere in the Treaty.
"Article 99 specifies that the proposals submitted by the Commission to the Council under its
authority shall be "without prejudice to the provisions of Articles zoo and zoz."
"7 Unlike the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.) Treaty, the E.E.C. Treaty envisages
different stages of activity and makes the attainment of the ultimate goal of European integration de-
pendent on several successive phases of development.
" Monaco, supra note 13, at 56o, states with reference to article zoo: "The scope of this article is
most comprehensive, because it not only covers legislative enactments, but also administrative regulations,
both for the execution and the application [of statutes], as well as all administrative acts emanating
from each government." [Ed. transl.]
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Treaty contained other express provisions relevant to approximation of laws? One
should not rule out the possibility that articles IOO-1O2 are not rendered inoperative
with respect to matters that the Treaty has subjected to express provisions for approx-
imation of laws, even if those provisions include a timetable for taking the different
steps necessary. Of course, under this view articles oo-Io2 would not be construed
in any case to impose a more difficult and complicated procedure for approximation
of laws than would be available in the absence of these articles. However, the
procedure prescribed in these articles would be applicable in those rare cases, like
that of article 22o, in which the Treaty, while outlining new fields of activity in the
task of approximating laws, does not define the method by which E.E.C. institutions
shall achieve this approximation. 9
II
APPROXIMATION (RAPPROCHEMENT) OF PROVISIONs HAVING Dnuer
INCIDENCE ON THE COMMON MARKET-ARTICLE i00
In so far as the E.E.C. Treaty's chapter on "approximation" of laws is concerned,
the provisions in article ioo are by far the most important. According to this
article, the Council, acting by unanimous vote on a proposal of the Commission,
and after previous consultation with the Assembly and the Economic and Social
Committee, shall issue directives for the approximation of such legislative and
administrative provisions of Member States as have a direct incidence on the Common
Market. In substance, then, there is recognized a prerogative of the Community
to ensure within the field of the Member States' domestic legal systems the conditions
for realizing the Common Market--either by promoting legislation to give effect to
the pledges contained in the E.E.C. Treaty or by causing the removal of obstacles
interposed by domestic legislation to such a realization2
The measures made available to the institutions of the E.E.C. to implement
this prerogative offer a more effective means to accomplish the objective than any
based on a general obligation or pledge of loyalty undertaken when the Treaty was
drawn up. Thus, the procedure authorized in article ioo really puts teeth in article
five, wherein the Member States pledge generally to take all action appropriate to
attain the objectives of the Treaty.
The procedure for intervention by the Community pivots on the directives of
the Council-directives which would be preceded by a pronouncement of the
Assembly concerning the. political opportuneness of the measures the Commission
has proposed and by an expression from the Economic and Social Committee as to
probable repercussions of such measures on the Common Market 2  The com-
" Article 22o directs that the Member States "shall, in so far as necessary, engage in negotiations with
each other" in pursuit of certain objectives.
"°As is hereafter discussed, the literal meaning of "approximation (rapprochement) of laws" implies
the idea of alignment with a pre-established model. In this connection, see Monaco, supra note 13, at
568.
2 Article oo. With reference to the Assembly, see articles 137-44; as to the Economic and
Social Committee, see articles 193-98.
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plexity of the procedure to be employed is justified by the fact that the intended
result impinges upon the sovereignty of the Member States. Directives of the
Council, simply by virtue of their existence, have a forcefulness and persuasiveness
generally sufficient to ensure compliance with their terms. Nevertheless, under
article 189 of the Treaty, a directive lacks direct legislative effect, in that domestic
agencies, while bound as to the result to be achieved, retain their competence as to
form and means. Thus, the measures utilized by the various Member States to
achieve the intended result may vary in form in accordance with the differences in
the constitutions of Member States and in their various laws ratifying the EE.C.
Treaty.F2
The approximation of laws envisaged by article ioo is not designed to operate
in specified areas of the juridical systems of the Member States seen in their
entirety, but only with respect to those rules that affect the establishment and the
functioning of the Common Market. This limitation furnishes a decisive argument
against too broad an interpretation of the tasks of the Community in order to pro-
mote a uniform law among the Member States?2 Of course, it remains to be seen
which legal and administrative rules will have the effect on the Common Market
required to invoke article ioo.
III
ELIMINATION oF DIsToRTIoNs op COMPETITIVE CoNTioNs-A TIcLE i01
The circumstances under which E.E.C. Treaty article Ioi will apply appear more
recognizable than those for invoking article ioo, since at first glance they refer to a
more restricted field. However, in light of the aims of the Treaty, this impression
could be misleading. In many ways, the tasks of the Community in maintaining
conditions of competition-even though encompassed within a more specific range
of competence--are no less vast or binding than those envisaged in article ioo.
For article ioi to apply, there must be a difference in the rules of the Member
States' domestic laws that is capable of producing a "distortion" in the conditions for
competition in the Common Market. In common with other terms borrowed from
the language of multilateral economic agreements, the concept of "distortion" has
no distinct, strict juridical meaning; nor does the Treaty illustrate its meaning or
limits.24 In its natural sense, the word has implications so wide that it clearly
" The German law of ratification of July 27, 1957, imposes a duty on the Government to inform the
Chamber of every provision of the Community in relation to which active measures of compliance will
need to be taken. See Thiesing, supra note 13, at 4. In Italy, in the absence of a special ratifying law,
the directives may be complied with either by a special law passed to that effect or by delegation by law
of the necessary powers to the Government. See Monaco, supra note 13, at 562.
"' See, e.g., Willemetz, L'harmonisation des ligislations, Le Droit Europ~en, Dec. 5, 1958, P. 176.
"'An exact idea of its implication may, nevertheless, be obtained from the preliminary documents
from which the E.E.C. Treaty was drawn up and from the very aims the Treaty expresses. Indeed, the
concept of distortion derives from the conviction that similar competitive conditions should prevail in
the Common Market once the economies of the Member States react upon one another. Distortion could
arise, with the same consequences as ain involuntary discrimination, from factors implicit in the
economies of the Member States, such as natural resources, the level of production, fixed responsibilities,
etc. On this point, see Tinberger, Les distortions et leur correction, in LE MAscHA CoMMUN Er SES
PROBLEMES 256 (1958) [a special issue of the Revue d'Economie Politique].
4LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
cannot coincide with the concept of distortion in article ioI of the E.E.C. Treaty.
In fact, it would be futile to attempt to eliminate some phenomena, which might be
labeled "distortions" of competition under an all-inclusive interpretation, resulting
from the variations in the political and economic structures of the Member States.
Nor should one rule out the possibility that ultimately a general state of equilibrium
will be reached whereunder a "distortion," which it is feared will result from one
element in a Member State's economy, will be offset through the combined effect of
other factors in that same economy.2 5
The aims to which the "harmonizing activity" of the Community are directed
by article ioI appear to have regard solely to those disturbances of competitive con-
ditions in the Common Market that, in the language of the Treaty's draftsmen, are
described as "specific distortions."26 Causes of such specific distortions would be, for
example:
i. Variations among the Member States with respect to systems of social security,
whose effect on industry may vary according to the basis of the system (which
may, for instance, be supported by the State out of the general taxes or be
based on contributory payments out of wages);
2. Differences among the fiscal systems of the Member States in the extent of
utilization of a graduated or progressive tax-of the principle that the greater
tax burden should fall on the more profitable sources of production.
Other special factors that might be conducive to distortion include differences among
the Member States with respect to use of direct or indirect taxation, systems of
financing social welfare, certain price controls, and policies regarding credit and
work conditions2 7
. The task of eliminating distortions of competitive conditions requires examination
of the most apt means to deal with these special factors conducive to distortions.
This task does not necessarily involve juridical measures, and it can be divorced
from the process of rapprochement of the laws. To a considerable extent the special
factors conducive to distortions can be coped with simply by the adoption of mutual
economic measures2
5 E.g., differences between the commitments of the various economies deriving from public expendi-
tures, or systems of social security, are usually compensated for by opportune variations of a tax on
exchange. National underevaluation, like overevaluation, can act as an incentive to the flow of imports
and exports, and, with the tax variations, can contribute to an even balance of payments. Differences in
the cost of production attributable to different salary levels may be offset by variations in the index of
productivity. On this whole problem, see COMITE INTER-GOuVERNEMENTAL DE MEssiN, RAPPOR.TS DES
CHsFS Dn DfiEGATIoN AUX MINISrRES DES AFFAIRS ETRANAoRES tit. 2, ch. 2 (x956) [hereinafter cited
as REPORT op THE MESsniA ComMIrTE].
26 Ibid.
"' "Work conditions" would include relationship between male and female salaries, hours of work,
overtime, paid holidays, and so on.
" The Commission may take suitable economic measures to safeguard industries otherwise placed
at a disadvantage. Instead of a system of subsidies, the Report of the Messina Committee prefers that the
E.E.C. remit customs duties prejudicial to poorly located industries-together with the prompt compliance
by all Member States with the rules of the Treaty. On the other hand, direct or indirect subsidies to
compensate for heavy burdens created by the Treaty's provisions may be considered inconsistent with the
Treaty.
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However, differences in the juridical systems of the Member States can them-
selves promote distortions of competitive conditions; and for these distortions the
remedy must be sought in juridical measures-the basis of which would be article
ioi. Indeed, article ioi of the E.E.C. Treaty-and the whole system of approxima-
tion of laws which it envisages-may be regarded as a simple appendix to the
chapter prescribing "Rules Governing Competition."
The procedure authorized by the Treaty reflects the difficulty of the subject
matter and the arduous tasks that the institutions of the E.E.C. will find in dis-
covering means to resolve such complex problems. As a first step in the process,
the Treaty provides for consultation between the Commission and interested Mem-
ber States-as is also required by article 18, which seeks to "promote close collabora-
tion between Member States in the social field." Should the consultations not
achieve their objective, then article ioi authorizes the Council to issue directives.
This procedure is considerably simpler than that employed in article ioo, no doubt
because here the issuance of the directives follows consultations that in themselves
are presumably rather complex.
IV
APPROXIMATION op FuTup.B PROVISIONS-ARTICLE I02
Article 102 complements its preceding article by authorizing measures to meet
the threat of "distortions" that might reasonably be feared as a result of legislative
or administrative provisions enacted after the E.E.C. Treaty came into effect.29 This
article takes on greater importance because, like article ioo, it is intended to apply
to future stages in the development of the Common Market. Article ioi, on the
other hand, refers to the juridical conditions prevailing in the different Member
States on the effective date of the E.E.C. Treaty. Accordingly, ever-increasing refer-
ence to article IO2 is to be expected as the Common Market progresses, with a cor-
responding decline in recourse to the preceding article.
Whenever a Member State proposes to pass a new law or modify an old one so
that a "distortion" is to be feared, it is bound to consult the Commission in order
to discover probable repercussions on the Common Market. Then, after consulting
with other Member States, the Commission will, in turn, recommend the best
measures to avoid such a distortion. This procedure differs from that of article ioi,
both in the duty of Member States to be wary lest their intended new provisions tend
to cause a distortion-and, in such event, to inform the Commission of their plans-
and in the provisions for the Commission's intervention. The Council is not in-
volved; and no directives are issued-merely nonmandatory recommendations, whose
binding power is limited.
" "Where there is reason to fear that the enactment or amendment of a legislative or administrative
provision will cause a distortion within the meaning of the preceding Article, the Member State desiring
to proceed therewith shall consult the Commission. After consulting the Member States, the Commission
shall recommend to the States concerned such measures as may be appropriate to avoid the particular
distortion." Article 102.
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In the not unlikely event'that a State ignores the Commission's recommendations,
article i02 precludes resort by that State to the terms of article Ioi in order to
persuade the other States to eliminate the distortion by modifying the provisions
of their own laws. However, this would not appear to prevent the use of measures
available to the Commission and Council under article I02(2)-i.e., economic
measures that do not call for modification of any juridical provisions. Even so,
this article seems inadequate in that it permits a Member State to create a "dis-
tortion" prejudicial to other states, but removable only by a modification of their
own laws. In fact, in these cases the distortion remains, and there is given merely
the satisfaction of stating that the blame for it belongs to the State that fails to
comply with the Commission's recommendation. One additional sanction provided
by article i02 against the non-complying Member States is its elimination of recourse
by that Member to the provisions of article io should the non-compliance with the
Commission's recommendation redound only to the detriment of this Member
State3
Article 1O2 may apply, of course, when the obligation to give notice of proposed
legislation is not observed by the Member States; thus, the Commission would be
authorized to make recommendations concerning the proposals if it acquired notice
from some source other than the State concerned that enactment of the new law
might prejudice competitive conditions in the Common Market. In practice, how-
ever, it is quite possible that the Commission, if not notified by the Member, may
hear of the new statute or administrative regulation only after its adoption-and when
the resultant distortion has become apparent. This contingency is not specifically
covered by article 1o2; and so it would probably be necessary to consult article lox,
which would seem to apply whenever a State fails to notify the Commission of a
legislative or administrative proposal in the erroneous belief that it will have no
bearing on competitive conditions in the Common Market, and when the Commis-
sion fails to hear of the proposal by some other means.
This conclusion would seem valid, since there is no bar to a broad interpretation
of article ioi. Article I02(2), which envisages the grave case of a distortion pro-
duced in contradiction to a recommendation by the Commission, would lead to
recourse, at least in important cases, to the provisions of article IoI. Only when the
distortion operates solely to the prejudice of the State responsible is the operation
of that article entirely excluded. Article 102 seeks to prevent a distortion; but it
must yield to article 1o when the existence of a distortion is in fact confirmed.
To adopt, on the other hand, an alternative strict interpretation of article 102,
which would lead to recourse to the Court of Justice on the basis that every failure
to give notice is itself a violation of the E.E.C. Treaty would, in practice, only
o "If the State desiring to enact or amend its own provisions does not comply with the recom-
mendations made to it by the Commission, other Member States may not be requested, in application of
Article ioi, to amend their own provisions in order to eliminate such distortion. If the Member State
which has ignored the Commission's recommendation causes a distortion to its own detriment only, the
provisions of Article ioi shall not apply." Monaco, supra note 13, at 567. [Ed. transl.]
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complicate matters, rather than solve them. Indeed, reference to the Court-should
only be the last resort for the most flagrant violations of the Treaty-violations
which may not be resolved in any other way. It can scarcely be justified in this
less critical situation of failure to give notice.
Sometimes it may occur that a Member State will not recognize the full conse-
quences of its legislative proposals-will not foresee their possible impingement on
competitive conditions in the Common Market. In this event, the State probably
will be prepared to make the necessary changes in its new or proposed legislation
without being required to do so by either the Council or the Court; indeed, probably
then there will be no need to go any further than the consultative procedures en-
visaged by both articles ioi and i02.
V
DELiMITING THE SCOPE OF ACTION BY E.E.C. INsnrrTIONs
In the field of European cooperation, the principle of reconciling and harmon-
izing the laws and regulations of the Member States has been accepted in preference
to the impracticable task of achieving complete uniformity3 ' The difficulties of
drafting uniform laws to be ratified simultaneously by several different States are
well known. It would be too ambitious to expect States which signed the E.E.C.
Treaty, after giving the institutions of the Community the sizable task of promoting
European economic integration, to add thereto the task of fostering a uniform
European law.
Even a first reading of the Treaty confirms this interpretation. The term "uni-
formity" is conspicuously absent from the various formulae used to express the tasks
of the Community in this field; instead, references are made to "coordination," 2
"harmonization, 33 "establishment of common rules,"3 4 "abolition of restrictions,"
' 5
"coordination through negotiation,"'3 and "approximation (rapproachement). ' '
The choice of expressions with respect to the varying methods of intervention by the
E.E.C. institutions-and in different degrees-seems, indeed, to be greatly concerned
to fix limits well short of the promotion of projects of uniform law, even in the
fields of economics and commerce.
In so far as articles OO-iO2 of the Treaty-which together comprise the chapter
entitled "Approximation of Laws"--are concerned, it will be recalled that the initia-
tive of the Commission is limited by the requirement that the legislative and admin-
" "It is not possible to attempt to modify in some way by decree the fundamental conditions of an
economy, such as those stemming from natural resources, the level of productivity, or the importance of
taxatiozi. Part of what is usually called harmonisation can be the result of the functioning of the market
itself, of the economic forces that it activates, and of the contacts which it establishes between those
affected." REPoRT OF THE MESSINA CoMmiTTEE 61. [Ed. transl.]
'E.g., articles 54(3)(g), 57(2), 70(I).
s E.g., articles 99, i2.
a' E.g., article 75-
"5 E.g., articles 49, 54.
" Article 220.
"'In addition to articles oo-o2, see article 27 and article x7--the latter referring to "harmonization
of social systems" and "approximation of legislative and administrative provisions."
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istrative provisions as to which it seeks to act must, by reason of their conflicting con-
tent, affect the establishment and functioning of the Common Market or cause a "dis-
tortion" in the conditions of competition. It might be contended that article 3(h) of
the E.E.C. Treaty authorizes a broader scope for approximation of laws. However,
in light of the preface to that article,"8 and the use in article 3 (h) of a word formula
corresponding to that of the chapter composed by articles 1oo-io2, 89 it would seem
that these articles are the implementation of article 3 (h) 40 Under this interpretation,
article 3(h) does not provide any general residual authority for attempting approxi-
mation of laws not elsewhere authorized in the E.E.C. Treaty.
Once one abandons the idea that promotion of a comprehensive uniform law for
the Community is implicit in all the subjects dealt with in the E.E.C. Treaty,41 it may
be said that in the Treaty's context "approximation (rapprochement) of laws" imports
the creation in the various juridical systems of the Member States of groups of similar
rules in particular fields. In fact, however much the Member States are bound in
terms of solidarity and cooperation, they do not lose their own individuality. The
work of reconciliation will simply be a progressive elimination of the most marked
juridical discrepancies through the mutual acceptance of common principles. For
instance, in corporation or company law, even though article ioo might be invoked
concerning a few subjects for which a certain degree of uniformity is required-
such as the formalities necessary for incorporation, the principles for determining
nationality, the currency law governing the rights of the respective classes of stock
88 "For the purposes set out in the preceding Article, the activities of the Community shall include
under the conditions and with the timing provided for in this Treaty. Article 3.
8 Note 14 supra.0 In this connection it should be noted that articles xoo-o2 appear to provide a complete system for
approximating the different laws to the extent necessary for the functioning of the Common Market.
Other Treaty articles dealing with the divergencies in legal and administrative provisions to be recon-
ciled should be deemed special cases in an area generally covered by articles 100-02.
' As Monaco, supra note 13, points out, this allows one to discount as irrelevant the copious
bibliography devoted to the theory and practice of uniform law, even though those contributions dealing
with the special field of reconciling legislative systems are now growing in number and importance in
view of the increasing attention given to studies devoted to the E.E.C. Treaty. One may, therefore, cite,
in addition to the works mentioned by Monaco, supra, and Thiesing, supra note 13, R. BERTRAND, PRIX,
CONCURRENCE ET MfARMONISATION DANS LE MARCHA COMMUN (958); N. CATALANO, LA COMMUNITA
ECONOMICA EUROPA E L'EURATOm ch. VII, at 158 et seq. (1959); CEASRE COSCIANI, PROBLEMI FISCALI DEL
MARcATO CoMMUNE 81 (1958); ROGER DUPAGE, DENIS CfPDE & MAURICE LEN0ELL, LE MARCIIA
COMMUN 26 et seq. (1957); H. EICHNER, ANNXHERUNG DER RECHTSSYSTEME FUR DEN GEMEINSAMEN MARKT,
INSBESONDERE AUF DEM GEBIET DER "WVIRTSCHAFTS-, FINANZ- UND STEUERPOLITIK m GEMEINSAMEN MARKT
39 et seq. (1957); V. GANsER, HARmONISIERUNG DER STEURSYSTEIE IN DER EUROPAISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTS-
OEMINsc:HAFr (957); R. HELLMAN, SOziALHRMONISIERUNO MIT zwEi GESICHTERN (1958); FRTZ W.
MEYR, HANS WILLGERoDT & J. HEINZ MULLER, INTERNATIONALE LOHNOEFXLLE; WIRTSCuAFTS-
POLITISCHE FOLGERUNGEN UND STATISTISCHE PROBLEMATIK (1956); UNIDROIT (INsTITUT INTERNATIONAL
POUR L'UNIFICATION Du DROIT PRIVi), OBSERVATIONS PRLIMINAIRES SUR LE RAPPROCHEMENT DES L GIS-
LATIONS DANS LE CADRE DU MARCH9 COMM N 1-23 (1957); Marchesano, Armonizzazione del regimn
fiscali nel quardo di un mercato unico, in Mondo Aperto, Oct. 1957, p. 3o1; Mattei, Armonizzazone
delle legislazioni, A.B.J. (Rome) (1958); Mesenberg, Zu den steuerlichen Fragen des eulropdisehen
Gemeinsamen Markies, 12 EUROPA ARCHIV 962 (1957); Di Carrobbio, Armonizzazione delle legislazionia,
in COMMUNITA ECONOMtICA EUROPA 27 (1958); Raulin, L'unification dif droit prive et l'unification
europeenne, in L'EuRoPE NAISSANTE 21 (1955); Willimetz, L'harnonisaion des le'gislations, Necssite
d'unifier les ragles de conflict de lois concernant l'existence et la /onctionnement des socie'tes commerciales,
in LR DRorr EUROPPEN 177 (1958).
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and bondholders, and the rules governing conflicts of laws-this article could not
be brought to bear on the great bulk of corporation law, because any disparity
existing in domestic rules of law would have no bearing on the establishment and
functioning of the Common Market.
Apart from the approximation (rapprochement) of laws already examined in
connection with articles ioo-iom, the competence of the E.E.C. institutions with
respect to the special, more limited cases dealt with in other parts of the Treaty
cannot be defined simply by reference to the terms-such as "coordination," "har-
monization," and "abolition of restrictions"4--used by the Treaty in describing what
action the Community institutions are authorized to take. One must also look at
the procedures provided for intervention by these institutions. A careful examina-
tion of these procedures reduces, and often eliminates, many differences that, at
first, might be inferred from the use of different terms--especially when these pro-
cedures are considered in relation to one another in the special cases to which
they apply, and in contrast to the omnibus procedures under articles ioo-io2.
When intervention by the institutions of the Community ensues-as it usually
does-in the issuance of a directive by the Council, the result is the promotion of
the necessary amendments to bring the legislative and administrative provisions of
the separate Member States to a point consistent with the terms of the E.E.C.
Treaty. Yet, in every case, in accord with the provisions of article 189 concerning
directives, the competence of the various institutions of the Member States, in
harmony with the provisions of their individual constitutions, is safeguarded so far
as the form and means of applying the directives are concerned. Whether the
Treaty speaks of "coordination, '44 of "harmonization,"4 5 or in slightly different
terms,," the directives, when used as the means for implementing the Community
policy, will have the same effect on the domestic juridical systems of the Member
States under article 189.
Of course, under the Treaty there still remain some cases where differences in laws
are not dealt with by means of "approximation (rapprochement) of laws" under-
taken through directives of the Council. These cases may vary from the standard
model of approximation (rapprochement) in the form and mode of intervention by
E.E.C. institutions or with respect to the institution that intervenes. The variations
may be better examined by means of the following list of instances in which the
Community is empowered to intervene to reduce or eliminate differences in the
legislative and administrative provisions of the Member States:
"2 See notes 32-37 supra.
"' With respect to the directives, one must examine their effect on the internal legal system of the
Member States. As to this problem, see generally, CATALANO, op. cit. supra note 41, ch. 2, at 45 et seq.;
GIAN STENDARI, I RAPPORTI FRA ORDINAMENTI GIURIDICI ITALIANO E DELLE COMMuNT; EUROPEE ch. 4,
at 55 et seq. (x958); ANGELO SERENI, LE ORGANIZZAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI ch. 9, 2, nos. 8-13 (1958);
Theising, supra note 13.
"'See E.E.C. Treaty arts. 54(3)(g), 57, 57(2), 58, 66, and 70(2).
"See id. art. x12.
"Article 87(i) authorizes, in the alternative, the use of directives in applying the principles of
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i. to promote approximation of customs laws and harmonization of labor laws
by means of recommendations to the Member States under articles 27 and 117;
2. to issue directives for:
a. approximation (rapprochement) of laws under articles iooo-2, as has been
discussed heretofore in this paper;
b. coordination of laws concerning right of establishment and freedom of
movement under articles 54(3), 57(2), 58, 66, and 70(2)-a coordination
that may come about at the instance of the Member State in the circum-
stances provided for in article 220; and
c. harmonization of certain export measures under article 112; and
3. to publish common rules for application in the Member States concerning
certain anti-competitive practices under articles 85-87 and transport policy under
article 75. (In these cases, the Community institutions may fulfill their tasks
by means of general regulations or by decisions addressed to specific addressees.)
The second category-both because it includes the cases covered by articles ioo-
io, the general authority for coping with 'significant differences in legal systems,
and because it encompasses a far greater number of situations of legal divergence
than the two other categories-would seem to provide the "normal form of inter-
vention" by the Community. Or it may be said that the standard competence of
the E.EC.. in reconciling different legal systems is by means of directives issued in
those cases which come within the second category listed above. Of course, from
the standpoint of a movement towards "unification" in the strict sense of the word,
the most significant cases are those.under the third category-cases in which there is
activity similar to some extent to that undertaken by other international organiza-
tions 7
A further and more detailed study of the E.E.C. Treaty could reveal that, in
addition to the substantial differences in the mode of the Community's intervention as
competition set out in articles 85 and 86. The Council is empowered to issue directives to eliminate
obstacles to the free movement of workers and to the right of free establishment.
" "A similar progress towards a uniform law is evident in the powers given to important agencies of
other international organizations-like the Council of Europe. See, e.g., Statute Instituting the Treaty
of London, May 5, 1949, art. i; Convention, annexed to the Benelux Treaty, of Nov. 5, 1955, art. 3
(creating an Interparliamentary Consultative Council). Yet here, in contrast to the E.E.C. Treaty, the
process of creating a uniform law consists of embracing rules affecting whole institutions in a Con-
vention. When the Convention is later approved by each Government (thus giving the rules binding power
from the moment of acceptance) earlier inconsistent rules in the domestic systems of each State are
replaced. By way of contrast, other international organizations aiming to promote a uniform law in
certain matters, lack the binding power of the terms of the Convention on the legislation of the
participating states that the decisions and the regulations of the Council of the E.E.C. enjoy. See, e.g.,
International Labor Organization (which came into force on June 13, 1921); U.N. International Civil
Aviation Organization (which came into force on April 3, 1947). The U.N. Economic Commission for
Europe, with the goal of reconciling mercantile practices, has pursued many measures in the formation of
a conventional law in the commercial field. A more rudimentary task is performed by article X of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which simply proposes the application and publication of rules
relating to international commerce (laws, regulations, judicial and administrative decisions, and so forth)
with the ultimate aim of attaining their uniform application.
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traced above, there exist other important procedural differences in the methods for
confronting divergencies in the legal systems of the Member States.48 Further
pursuit of this inquiry is, however, beyond the scope of the present article.
d8 In some cases, the process of making a decision of the Council is furthered by a proposal of the
Assembly or the Commission. Article 99. On other occasions, reference is made to the judgment of the
Economic and Social Committee, articles 49, 57(2); sometimes in conjunction with the judgment of the
Assembly. See, e.g., articles 54(), 56(2), and 70(I).
